£57m to keep football safe: And we’re talking about selling more beer!

From Westminster to Wetherspoons, the case for allowing alcohol back into the stands sounds seductively simple. What worries me is not the pint. It is how easily we count the value of selling it while overlooking the people and public services required to make that sale safe.

Ian Fox | Founder, Safer Spaces for All | Former Head of National Doorwatch

There is one figure I would like to put into this debate before we talk about fairness, freedom, rugby, cricket or whether somebody should be allowed to take a pint back to their seat.

It is £56.82 million.

There is no official national dataset for the cost of policing football, an important qualification. But figures supplied by the UK Football Policing Unit and reported by the House of Commons Library put the cost of police services for football in England and Wales at £71.69 million in 2023-24. Clubs contributed £14.87 million. According to the UKFPU, taxpayers picked up the remaining £56.82 million. The reason matters too. The law generally allows clubs to be charged for policing on land they own or lease, while much of the policing in surrounding streets and public spaces falls on the public purse. [1]

Numbers that large are difficult to comprehend, so let us give £56.82 million some human scale.

The current entry salary at NHS Band 5 is £32,073, the band at which newly qualified nurses typically start. On salary alone, £56.82 million is equivalent to the basic starting pay of roughly 1,770 nurses. That is a comparison of scale, not a suggestion that a police budget can simply be converted into nursing posts, and it excludes the other costs of employing someone. But it tells us what the number means. [2]

Or consider family support. Evidence submitted to Parliament this year by the Centre for Young Lives, based on its analysis of local-authority data, found that £577 million was spent on 2,100 Family Hubs and children’s centres in 2023-24, an average of about £275,000 per centre. On that measure, £56.82 million is equivalent to the average annual expenditure of around 207 Family Hubs. Again, it is a scale comparison, not a Treasury cost model. [3]

Against those numbers, one of the figures now being used to promote relaxation of the alcohol restriction is £100,000 a year for a club.

We should be clear about where that number comes from. It is not an economic study. Sacha Lord, chair of the Nighttime Industries Association, said he had spoken to a director of one unnamed National League club who believed the change would be worth a minimum of £100,000 a season. It may prove right. It may prove conservative. It may prove optimistic. At present it is the estimate of one unnamed director. [4]

For another sense of scale, one private salary database currently estimates the mean pay of a senior Premier League player at £77,882 a week. Football salaries are not officially published in a comprehensive league dataset, so that figure should also be treated for what it is: an estimate. Nevertheless, it puts the supposed £100,000 annual prize into perspective. We are in roughly the territory of a little over one average Premier League player’s weekly wage. [5]

Perhaps we are looking down the wrong end of the telescope.

I say that as somebody who loves football. Not simply the Premier League version, but the whole social ecosystem around it. The ball kicked around a playground. Two coats for goalposts. Parents freezing on Sunday-morning touchlines. The non-league club that gives a town something in common. The stranger with whom you may agree about almost nothing who suddenly becomes your best friend because somebody scores in the 94th minute.

Football remains one of the most effective pieces of social glue we possess. From the playground to the Premier League, it creates belonging, identity and shared experience in communities where those things increasingly matter.

I also write as the founder of Safer Spaces for All and as the former head of National Doorwatch. When I led National Doorwatch, our concern was the people working at the sharp end of the licensed economy. Door supervisors were expected to turn rules written elsewhere into safe nights out, often in difficult circumstances involving alcohol, drugs, confrontation and the simple human problem of telling somebody something they did not want to hear. National Doorwatch’s 2011 consultation work subsequently appeared in academic research into the regulation of private security, and contemporary industry reporting records our attempts to put the experience of frontline staff into the regulatory conversation. [6]

That experience is why something feels missing from the present debate.

We keep talking about the right to buy the pint. We talk rather less about the person who eventually has to say no to the next one.

The pub has rules for a reason

The Prime Minister’s argument deserves to be stated fairly. Andy Burnham says football has changed, that it is unfair to treat football supporters differently from those attending other sports, and that there is a case for trying a different approach, potentially through a pilot. The Football Supporters’ Association and EFL have welcomed reconsideration. The UK Football Policing Unit has urged caution and called for examination of the evidence before fundamental change. [7]

Nor are those seeking reform without evidence.

Researchers have argued that the existing prohibition may have unintended consequences. It may encourage supporters to drink more before entering the stadium, to drink rapidly on concourses before kick-off and at half-time, and to create congestion in exactly those concourses we are trying to keep safe. Professors Geoff Pearson, Mark James and Clifford Stott made precisely those arguments to Parliament. They deserve answering rather than dismissing. [8]

Indeed, the Culture, Media and Sport Committee reached what seems to me the most useful starting point in 2023. It concluded that the available evidence provided a compelling case for neither retaining the status quo nor significantly relaxing the law. It supported a properly designed pilot and better evidence gathering before wider decisions were made. [8]

That is where my concern begins.

If this is genuinely going to be an evidence-based exercise, we need to measure the whole exercise, not merely whether the bar takes more money and most supporters behave themselves.

Start with the Licensing Act.

We regulate alcohol differently from tea, coffee or a football shirt because experience tells us that the consequences of selling it can extend beyond the customer who buys it. The Licensing Act 2003 has four objectives: preventing crime and disorder, public safety, preventing public nuisance and protecting children from harm. Government guidance says that each has equal importance. It specifically recognises the effects on residents, businesses, public transport, toilets, street cleaning, litter and the wider environment when concentrations of drinkers are poorly managed. [9]

The licensing regime is therefore based on managed consumption. Depending on the premises and the risks, there may be CCTV, door supervisors and other conditions. Selling alcohol to somebody who is drunk is an offence. The whole system rests on a simple proposition: somebody must remain responsible for what happens after the till rings. [9]

The existing football restriction creates an imperfect but important practical control point. A supporter who wants another drink has to return to the area in which alcohol is being sold and consumed. That gives staff another opportunity to see them and, where necessary, refuse service.

Allow alcohol to move throughout the seating bowl and that responsibility does not vanish. It changes location.

A supporter buys drinks and takes them back to the stand. A friend buys the next round. Somebody else buys another. The bar worker may never see the original customer again. If behaviour deteriorates twenty rows from the concourse, somebody still must intervene.

Usually that somebody is a steward.

Minimum wage. Maximum risk

This is where a superficially simple commercial proposition becomes a human one.

The National Living Wage is currently £12.71 an hour. Football’s own Safety Officers Association has already asked Parliament whether it is reasonable for stewards to be paid minimum wage while potentially facing physical and verbal assault and simultaneously being expected to understand safeguarding, counter-terrorism measures, emergency first aid and crowd safety. Its evidence described shortages of qualified and experienced stewards, increasing reliance on agencies and clubs reporting that training costs were outside their budgets. [10]

Elsewhere in the same submission, the association made two observations which deserve to sit alongside the proposed £100,000 of additional revenue: “Safety budgets are not increasing” and safety can be regarded as a “zero return” expense. [10]

That does not prove clubs would fail to spend additional alcohol revenue on safety. It means we have no sensible basis for assuming that they will.

This is particularly important because violence against people working in frontline security is not hypothetical.

Research by Andrew Perkins into British door supervisors found that 81 per cent of respondents had been physically assaulted in the previous year and almost 98 per cent had been threatened with violence. It is older research and concerns door supervision rather than football stewarding specifically, so it should not be misrepresented as a current football statistic. Its importance is that it demonstrates how long the extraordinary occupational exposure of the people policing alcohol-fuelled environments has been understood. [11]

More recent peer-reviewed research involving 754 UK security operatives found extensive experience of verbal abuse, threats and physical violence, with 39.3 per cent of respondents meeting the study’s threshold for symptoms consistent with PTSD. The researchers also identified shortcomings in employer support for mental health and wellbeing. [12]

The point is not that somebody quietly drinking a pint creates danger for a steward. Of course they do not.

The risk appears when authority has to be exercised. When somebody has to say: you have had enough; stop doing that; move back to your seat; give me the drink; or you need to leave.

Alcohol may be sold by the bar. The confrontation takes place in Row 27.

That is why I keep returning to a simple question: who becomes safer?

We should also ask whether the safety system we already have is as strong as we think

There is an assumption running through much of this debate that, if a change requires more security or better stewarding, the industry can simply supply it.

The evidence suggests greater caution.

The SIA’s 2024-25 annual report records a 50 per cent rise in training-malpractice cases and says awarding organisations withdrew approval from 11 commercial training providers. In 2024 the regulator successfully prosecuted a security-company owner who had deployed 26 people using fraudulent SIA licences across 832 shifts, after the investigation began with a fraudulent licence discovered at Boxpark Wembley. In July this year the SIA ended its endorsement of BIIAB for licence-linked qualifications after concerns about standards. [13]

None of that justifies suggesting the security industry is generally fraudulent. It plainly is not. Most security and stewarding personnel are legitimate people trying to do a difficult job properly.

It does justify asking whether counting names on a deployment sheet tells us enough.

There is the number of staff required. There is the number recorded as present. Then there is the number who are properly trained, appropriately licensed where necessary, familiar with the venue, correctly deployed and actually capable of carrying out the function expected of them.

A genuine safety assessment needs to know the third number.

And it needs to know it before a pilot begins.

Women’s football is useful evidence, not a substitute for men’s evidence

The strongest contemporary evidence for relaxation comes from women’s football and it should be treated seriously.

WSL Football reported in January that its Fan Choice pilot had passed 100 fixtures without any reported pilot-related incidents or ejections. Supporters attending pilot fixtures gave their feeling of safety an average score of 9.4 out of 10, support for the scheme rose from 58 per cent to 70 per cent, and clubs were encouraged to provide alcohol-free blocks. [14]

That is a positive result.

What it tells us is that the arrangement has worked well in the environment in which it was tested.

It does not tell us that every relevant variable is identical in men’s football.

Home Office figures for the 2025-26 domestic season record 1,963 football-related arrests or other police actions associated with regulated matches in England and Wales. Four were recorded at women’s matches. We should not turn those figures into a simplistic male-versus-female risk ratio because equivalent attendance denominators are not provided for that comparison. But they do demonstrate that the policing environments are not interchangeable. [15]

Just over half, 54 per cent, of those football-related arrests and police actions occurred inside stadia. The other 46 per cent did not. That is perhaps one of the most important facts in this debate, because it reminds us that the impact of a football match does not stop at the turnstile. [15]

Neither should the experiment.

Wembley shows where the hidden bill goes

Wembley gives us a useful glimpse of the infrastructure that disappears when we talk only about what a club might earn.

Following the disorder surrounding the Euro 2020 final, Brent Council strengthened its event-day arrangements around the stadium. Its 2022 report records an annual council contribution of £122,000 to the “Best in Class” programme for Wembley event-day arrangements. It is important to add the next line from the same report: additional event-day costs incurred by the council were recharged to the stadium. We should neither understate nor inflate the public bill. [16]

What is striking is what the programme was dealing with. Brent reported reductions in anti-social behaviour, disorder, street urination and litter after stronger controls. The council explicitly described restrictions on event-day alcohol sales as inconveniencing some businesses but argued that the social and community benefits outweighed that inconvenience. [16]

Think about the comparison. One local authority’s annual contribution to one part of the infrastructure around Wembley was £122,000, while £100,000 is being circulated nationally as a potentially exciting annual gain from additional alcohol revenue at one club.

That does not prove the proposal is economically irrational. It demonstrates why the economic calculation cannot stop at the club’s till.

The same is true of the £56.82 million police figure. That money is not a cost caused by the proposed change. It is a cost under the existing system. But precisely because the public is already carrying such a substantial part of football’s safety footprint, any proposal that changes the risk environment should ask whether public demand rises, falls or stays the same.

There is even a plausible argument that allowing controlled drinking inside stadiums could reduce pre-loading and street drinking outside. If that happens, it should show up in the evidence and should count in favour of reform.

But we have to measure it.

A real pilot starts before the first pint is sold

This is where I think the current debate needs to become much more demanding.

If government proceeds with an independent pilot, the experiment should not begin when the first supporter walks into a stand carrying a beer.

It should begin months earlier with a baseline assessment of every participating club.

We need to know, under the existing rules, how many stewards and security personnel each category of fixture requires and how many actually report for duty. We need to know their qualifications, agency dependence, turnover and venue familiarity. We need existing figures for assaults and verbal abuse against staff, service refusals, ejections, medical incidents, alcohol sales, police deployments, ambulance demand and incidents outside the ground.

The surrounding community belongs in that baseline too. What does the council provide? What is recharged to the club and what falls to taxpayers? What happens to pubs and other businesses? What complaints do residents make? What happens on trains and at stations? What do police and emergency services deal with, in the hours after full time?

The workers themselves need an independent reporting route. If a steward believes the experiment has made their job more dangerous, they should not have to rely solely on the organisation benefiting financially from the change to record that experience.

And the stop conditions must be determined before the experiment begins. If the agreed staffing level is not reached, what happens? If assaults or medical interventions rise, at what point is the pilot reviewed? Who has the authority to stop it?

Those questions are easy to answer around a table six months beforehand. They are rather harder when tens of thousands of Arsenal and Tottenham supporters are already outside, broadcasters are live, the police operation is under way and cancelling the match would cost a fortune.

If we do not know how safe and compliant the system was before the experiment, we cannot know what the experiment changed.

Football deserves a better argument than ‘why not?’

There is an appealing simplicity to the case for reform. Rugby does it. Cricket does it. Women’s football has done it successfully. Football supporters are adults. Why shouldn’t they take a pint to their seat?

I understand that argument.

What my years around the licensed trade taught me is that the interesting part begins after the word “yes”.

References

Alcohol regulation exists because one person’s purchase can create responsibilities for somebody else. Football stewarding exists because rules eventually require a human being to enforce them. Public policing exists because the effects of a major commercial event do not always remain on private property.

Men’s football is already supported by a substantial public safety infrastructure. According to the UKFPU figures, taxpayers met £56.82 million of its policing costs in 2023-24. In scale that is roughly 1,770 newly qualified nurses’ starting salaries or the average annual expenditure of around 207 Family Hubs.

At the same time, some of the people actually standing between a crowd and a problem are being recruited at minimum-wage rates.

I do not believe football supporters need protecting from themselves. The overwhelming majority are perfectly capable of drinking responsibly and going home without troubling anybody.

That is not the point.

Safety systems are not designed around the person who never needs them. They are designed around the moment somebody does.

Football is far too important to our communities to settle this question by soundbite. From the playground to the Premier League, it gives millions of us something to belong to. That is exactly why it deserves better.

So run the pilot if a properly independent assessment concludes that one can be run safely. Test the argument that it reduces pre-loading. Test whether concourses become safer. Measure the commercial benefit properly.

But measure the whole system.

Count the pint. Count the displaced spending. Count the extra staff. Count the abuse. Count the police, NHS and council demand. Count what happens outside the ground and after the final whistle.

Above all, count the people.

Because the easiest number in this debate is the price of the beer.

The difficult one is the cost of making it safe.

 

 

Sources and notes

References correspond to the bracketed numbers in the article. Web sources were checked during preparation of this draft on 25 September 2026.

[1] House of Commons Library, Football policing costs and club contributions: House of Commons Library briefing

[2] NHS Employers, NHS pay scales 2026/27: NHS Employers pay scales

[3] UK Parliament written evidence, Centre for Young Lives: Family Hubs and children’s centres: Parliamentary written evidence

[4] The Caterer, report carrying the £100,000 National League club estimate: The Caterer report

[5] Salary Sport, Premier League player salary estimates: Salary Sport estimates

[6] National Doorwatch 2011 consultation work and contemporary industry context: Sebastian Booth PhD thesis, University of York (2019) | IFSEC Global contemporary interview/context

[7] Report on Andy Burnham’s proposal to reconsider football alcohol restrictions: The Guardian

[8] House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Safety at Major Sporting Events: Committee report

[9] Home Office, revised Guidance issued under section 182 of the Licensing Act 2003: Home Office licensing guidance

[10] Current National Living Wage and Football Safety Officers Association evidence on stewarding, pay, shortages and safety budgets: GOV.UK: National Living Wage £12.71 | FSOA written evidence to Parliament

[11] Andrew Perkins, Taking it on the Chin: Violence Against British Door Supervisors: Perkins paper

[12] Talas, Button, Doyle & Das, Violence, abuse and the implications for mental health and wellbeing of security operatives: University of Portsmouth research record

[13] Security Industry Authority evidence on training malpractice, fraudulent licences and BIIAB: SIA Annual Report 2024-25 | SIA prosecution: cloned/fraudulent licences | SIA decision on BIIAB endorsement

[14] WSL Football, Fan Choice pilot surpasses 100 fixtures: WSL Football

[15] Home Office, Football-related arrests and banning orders, 2025-26 domestic season: Home Office statistics

[16] Brent Council, Wembley event-day arrangements following the Casey Review: Brent Council report

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